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THE FLOODING OF AN AMERICAN
CANAAN: THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT AND THE VALUE OF WILDLIFE
MICHAEL W. DINGLE*
In November of 1979, the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) low-
ered the floodgates of its Tellico Dam, thereby converting a substan-
tial portion of the Little Tennessee River into a lake.' Although the
closure itself took less than one hour,2 the TVA,3 a wholly-owned
public corporation of the United States, began construction of the
Tellico Dam and Reservior Project in 1967.1 The project's twelve-
year construction period was attributed to several reasons. One of
the main reasons for this delay was the discovery, in the summer of
1973, of a previously unknown species of perch-the snail darter.'
* B.A., Bates College, 1973; M.A., University of Colorado, 1976; J.D., Washing-
ton University, 1981.
1. The Little Tennessee River originates in the mountains of northern Georgia
and flows through North Carolina into Tennessee, until it joins the Big Tennessee
River near Knoxville. Closure of the Tellico Dam would change the lower 33 miles
of the Little Tennessee into a 16,000 acre lake. For a description of the lower segment
of the Little Tennessee prior to closure, see Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 339
F. Supp. 806, 808 (E.D. Tenn. 1972).
2. [1979] 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1604. According to a TVA spokesperson, it
would take three to four weeks for the reservoir behind the dam to reach its winter
depth of approximately 807 feet. Id.
3. The Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933 established the TVA. 16 U.S.C.
§§ 831-831dd (1976).
4. Congress appropriated initial funds for the project in the Public Works Appro-
priations Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 89-689, 80 Stat. 1002, 1014 (1966).
5. The discoverer, Dr. David Etnier, a University of Tennessee ichthyologist, sci-
entifically describes the snail darter, Percina (Imostoma) Tanasi, in the 88 PROCEED-
INGS OF TIlE BIOLOGICAL SOCIETY OF WASHINGTON, 469-88 (Jan. 22, 1976). The
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
This three-inch, tannish-colored fish, whose total population was esti-
mated to be in the range 10,000 to 15,000, attracted the attention and
support of environmentalists, national conservation groups, and local
citizens. Under the aegis of the Endangered Species Act of 19736
(ESA), concerned persons initiated a suit and ultimately convinced
the United States Supreme Court to enjoin the project.7 In response,
TVA supporters in Congress8 quickly proposed and gained passage of
legislation 9 which increased the flexibility in the ESA. These 1978
amendments ° allowed for case-by-case exemptions from the ESA by
a cabinet-level Endangered Species Committee (ESC).II Neverthe-
less, members of the ESC voted unanimously to deny an exemption
to the Tellico Dam. 2 Tellico supporters then immediately intro-
duced legislation in Congress to abolish the ESC and to exempt Tel-
lico from the ESA.' 3 President Carter further aided the Tellico's
snail darter is a sub-species of the approximately 130 known species of darters. In
Tennessee alone, 85 to 90 species of darters exist. Scientists are discovering and clas-
sifying new species of darters at the rate of about one per year. See TVA v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153, 159 & n.7 (1978).
6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976) (amended 1978).
7. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
8. Notably, Sen. Baker (R.-Tenn.) and Sen. Culver (D.-Iowa).
9. Senators Baker and Culver proposed an amendment that passed by a 94-3 mar-
gin on July 19, 1978. S.2899, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. S 11158-60 (daily
ed. July 19, 1978). A similar bill passed the House of Representatives by a margin of
384-12. H.R. 14104, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG. REC. H12877-80 (daily ed. Oct.
14, 1978). For a full discussion of these bills, see Note, Endangered Species Act
Amendments of 1978- A Congressional Resfponse to Tennessee Valley Authority .Hill,
5 COLUM. J. ENv. L. 283 (1979).
10. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 96-632, 92 Stat.
3751-3767 (amending 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976)).
11. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(7) (Supp. 11 1978). '
12. See Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1979, at 2, col. 3. In denying the exemption, one of
the committee members (Council of Economic Advisors Chairman) Charles Schultze
said, "[t]he project is 95% complete, and if one takes just the cost of finishing it against
the benefits, and does it properly, it doesn't pay, which says something about the
original design." [1979] 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1776. In August of 1978, TVA pub-
lished a report containing cost-benefit analyses for the originally designed Tellico
Project as well as various alternative schemes. See TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY,
ALTERNATIVES FOR COMPLETING THE TELLICO PROJECT (1978) [hereinafter cited as
ALTERNATivES]. It should be noted that the ESC based its decision on the calcula-
tions contained in the TVA report. The Senate Committee On Environment and Pub-
lic Works has subsequently approved the ESC's decision. See S. REP. No. 151, 96th
Cong., 1st Sss. 8 (1979).
13. Sen. Baker, who was particularly upset by the ESC's denial of exemption,
stated: "If that's all the good the committee process can do, to put us right back where
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ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
cause by signing a huge energy and water development appropria-
tions act. A rider to the Act authorized the TVA to complete Tel-
lico notwithstanding the ESA or any other law. 5
President Carter's reluctance to veto an entire energy appropria-
tions measure for the sake of a "useless minnow" is perhaps politi-
cally excusable. 6 What is somewhat more difficult to justify is the
unfortunate fact that, despite sound decisions by both the Supreme
Court and the ESC, the darter's future is now uncertain. This Note
will trace the judicial and legislative history of the ESA along with its
relation to Tellico and the snail darter. Part I examines the 1973 Act
and its accompanying litigation. Part II explores TVA's attempt to
justify completion of the Tellico Project and examines two critical
studies-one by the General Accounting Office (GAO) and one by
the University of Tennessee. Part III discusses congressional reaction
to TV v. Hill, some crucial changes brought about by the 1978 and
1979 ESA amendments, and recent judicial interpretations of those
amendments. The Note will conclude with an assessment of the fu-
ture for both the snail darter and the ESA.
I. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973 AND
ACCOMPANYING LITIGATION
A. The Endangered Species Act of 1973
The turn of the century marked the beginning of federal efforts to
prevent the extinction of wildlife caused by human encroachment on
the natural environment. Congressional concern over the extermina-
tion of the passenger pigeon' 7 led to the passage of the Lacey Act' 8 in
we started from, we might as well save the time and expense. I will introduce legisla-
tion to abolish the [C]ommittec and exempt the Tellico Dam from the provisions of
the Act." [1979] 9 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) 1777. Baker went on to introduce two bills,
S.242 & S.243, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979). Sen. Sasser (D.-Tenn.) also introduced a
bill to exempt Tellico. S.298, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
14. Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-69,
43 Stat. 437-51, (Sept. 25, 1979).
15. Rep. Duncan (R.-Tenn.) introduced the rider as H.R. 4388, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1979).
16. Coupled with the fact that an election was approaching, the President possibly
may have refrained from vetoing the appropriations measure in return for congres-
sional reauthorization of the ESA through fiscal year 1982.
17. See 33 CONG. REc. 4871 (1900) (remarks of Rep. Lacey).
18. 16 U.S.C. §§ 701-715s (1976) (affords protection to insectivorous birds and
various species of migratory game).
1981]
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1900. Many of the federal wildlife laws which followed the Lacey
Act, however, were limited in terms of the nature of the protection
afforded and the range of species protected. 19 Congress first at-
tempted to provide comprehensive protection for endangered species
in the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1966.20 This act ad-
dressed the problem of habitat destruction within the National Wild-
life Refuge System by providing a program for the conservation of
selected native fish and wildlife species threatened with extinction.2'
The 1966 Act, however, excluded plant species from its protection
and provided no plan for international cooperation.22 Moreover, it
did not regulate interstate commerce in endangered species and
placed no restriction on their taking.2" Three years later, Congress
passed the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969.24 The
1969 Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to formulate and
maintain a list of species threatened with worldwide extinction.25
The Act also prohibited importation of endangered species into this
country, except for certain limited purposes.26 Like its 1966 prede-
cessor, however, it failed to provide protection to plant species. In
addition, it allowed the taking of endangered species in areas not ac-
19. See, e.g., Migratory Bird Conservation Act of 1929, 16 U.S.C. §§ 715 et seq.
(1976); Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, id. §§ 668-668ii (1976); id. §§ 1157-
1187 (1976) (fur seals and sea otters); id. §§ 1331-1340 (1976) (protects wild burros
and horses from capture and killing). For a fine study of federal wildlife legislation,
see M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW (1977). See also
Palmer, Endangered Species Protection: A History of CongressionalAction, 4 ENVT'L
L. AFF. 255 (1975); Comment, Vanishing Wildlfe and Federal Protective Efforts, I
ECOLOGY L.Q. 520 (1971).
20. Act of October 15, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966) (repealed by
Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 903 (1973)).
21. Id. § 2(a). The 1966 Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior to determine
and designate those species threatened with extinction and to utilize his authority
under existing laws to protect those species. See M. BEAN, supra note 19, at 371-74.
22. See Palmer, supra note 19.
23. See M. BEAN, supra note 19, at 374 & n.12.
24. Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (1969) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 668cc-I to cc-5
(1970)) (repealed 1973).
25. Id. § 3(a).
26. Id. § 2. The exceptions are contained in id. § 3(b) ("to minimize undue eco-
nomic hardship," the Secretary could authorize a contract to continue for up to one
year, which imported "appropriate" quantities of endangered species prior to the de-
termination that the species were endangered.); id. § 3(c) (the Secretary could permit
importation of endangered species for zoological, educational, scientific, and preser-
vation purposes).
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quired by the Secretary of the Interior." Despite the advances made
by the 1966 and 1969 Acts, by 1972 it became apparent that extant
legislation did not provide the management tools necessary to act
early enough to save a vanishing species? 8
The acknowledgment that previous laws provided too little protec-
tion, too late, was an implicit recognition of a reversibility problem.29
Many species cannot be saved if their total population drops below a
certain critical number or if other environmental factors exceed cer-
tain limits. The point of irreversibility varies among species and de-
pends upon such factors as genetic vulnerability, area characteristics,
and the nature of competing species.30 The numerical population of
a species is notper se a reliable criterion of endangerment. 31 A key
factor, though, is the vulnerability of a particular species.32 In 1975,
27. Section 12(c) of the 1969 Act expanded the acquisition powers that the 1966
Act had initially conferred upon the Secretary of the Interior.
28. The President's 1972 Environmental Program, 8 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES.
Doc. 218, 223-24 (Feb. 8, 1972).
29. For a discussion of the problem of reversibility, see Ramsay, Priorities in Spe-
cies Preservation, 5 ENVL'T AFF. 595 (1976).
30. Id. at 603-04. A species' population does indeed renew itself as long as condi-
tions within its "ecosystem" (a community of living organisms and the physical envi-
ronment with which they interact) remain suitable for its reproduction and growth. If
conditions become unsuitable as a result of pollution, habitat destruction, or activities
of other species, the renewability of a population may be lost. Dassman, Wildlife
Ecosystems, in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA 23 (H. Brokaw ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited
as Ecosystems].
31. See Ramsay, supra note 29, at 598. For example, the spotted bat (Euderma
Maculatum) is rare, but is in no danger of extinction. It may always have been rare,
and may survive indefinitely. See U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE
SERVICE, THREATENED WILDLIFE OF THE UNITED STATES 215 (1973). On the other
hand, the sperm whale and the brown pelican, while numerous, face sufficient danger
from pollution of their habitats and so may be threatened. Id. at V. The Northern
Elephant Seal is a particularly telling example of this phenomenon. The species, ex-
ploited to the brink of extinction earlier this century, has made a rapid recovery under
federal protection. Nevertheless, recent research raises an ominous possibility. This
species' population declined to such a level that present stocks may be "genetically
homogeneous" and may lack the resilience necessary to face environmental change.
See Norris, Marine Mammals andMan, in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA 322 (H. Brokaw
ed. 1978) (citing Bonnel and Selander, Elephant Seals: Genetic Variation and Near
Extinction, 184 SCIENCE 908-909 (1974)). See also Ripley & Lovejoy, Threatened and
Endangered Species, in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA 368 (H. Brokaw ed. (1978) [herein-
after cited as Threatened and Endangered Species] (although the current population of
Northern Elephant Seals is about 30,000, the seals are said to have the genetic varia-
bility and environmental flexibility of a population numbering only twenty).
32. The problem of estimating vulnerability is rather complicated because preser-
vation efforts often begin "after the fact." A species may simply fail to recover. For
1981]
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the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) predicted that extinc-
tion would threaten as many as ten percent of all existing plant and
animal species within the next generation.33 The CEQ has recently
stated that by the year 2000, the figure may increase to fifteen to
twenty percent.34
Congressional hearings 35 and reports36 which preceded the passage
of the ESA37 indicate that Congress was well aware of the impor-
tance of species protection and preservation. Section 2(b) of the ESA
genetic reasons, species tend to become more vulnerable as their numbers diminish.
For example, as its population dwindles, a species' gene pool (the aggregate of genes
possessed by the entire population) becomes less diverse. One consequence is that
survival traits may yield to harmful "recessive" traits existing within the gene pool.
Another consequence is "hybridization", the interbreeding of two distinct species.
This phenomenon increases as populations become smaller and the number of genes
controlling hybrid-suppression mechanisms diminish. These hybrid-suppression
mechanisms are usually manifested behaviorally in large populations by discrimina-
tory treatment during times of breeding. Normally, members of a large population
will refuse to breed with hybrids because the latter invariably exhibit different re-
sponse patterns or timing. If the population of the "pure" species decreases signifi-
cantly, hybrids may take advantage of the scarcity of mates in the "pure" population
and so bypass the hybrid-suppression mechanism. See Ramsey, supra, note 29, at
598-99 & n.25. Recently, the Secretary of the Interior has classified the Leon Springs
Pupfish as endangered. 45 Fed. Reg. 54678 (1980). The population of the pupfish has
declined because of hybridization with a closely related species. Id.
33. See COUNCIL ON ENVT'L QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-1975, 408
(1975).
34. See COUNCIL ON ENVT'L QUALITY, THE GLOBAL 2000 REPORT TO THE PRESI-
DENT: ENTERING THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 37 (1980). An estimate prepared for
this Study suggests that between 500,000 and 2,000,000 species could be extinguished
by the year 2000 mainly because of habitat destruction. Id. at 328-31. Although most
of the projected extinctions will result from clearing and degrading tropical forests,
approximately 274 freshwater vertebrate species are threatened because of the
profound effects of damming and channelization on freshwater ecosystems, Id. at
328-31, 344. In addition, some of the most important losses will involve species, sub-
species, and varieties of cereal grains. Id. at 38.
35. See, e.g., Hearings on Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1972 before a
Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Commerce, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 124
(1972) (statement of Sen. Cranston).
36. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No.412, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 4, 5 (1973); S. REP. No. 307,
93rd Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1973); reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2989. See also Ecosystems, supra note 30, at 26 (each species is a storehouse of irre-
placeable genetic material whose loss we cannot afford); Threatened and Endangered
Species, supra note 31, at 367 (we are far too ignorant of the biology of our planet to
state which species may ultimately have great practical value and which not).
37. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) (current version at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-
1542 (Supp. III 1979).
(Vol. 22:161
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distilled these concerns by stating the purposes of the Act. These pur-
poses are: providing a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered and threatened species depend may be conserved; and
providing a program for the conservation of such endangered and
threatened species.38 Moreover, Section 2(c) issued a strong endan-
gered species preservation mandate to all federal agencies, not lim-
ited to those traditionally associated with wildlife management. 9
Section 7 of the ESA 4 provided the substantive basis for imple-
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (Supp. III 1979) (the 1978 or 1979 amendments did not
affect the ESA of 1973's statement of purposes).
39. The policy statement of the ESA (also unaffected by the 1978 and 1979
amendments) provides that "all Federal departments and agencies shall seek to con-
serve endangered species and threatened species and shall utilize their authorities in
furtherance of the purposes of this Act." 16 U.S.C. § 1531(c) (Supp. III 1979). Signif-
icantly, this policy statement is much stronger than that of the 1969 Act. The 1969
Act declared that congressional policy is "to protect species of native fish and wildlife
• . . that are threatened with extinction, and, insofar as ispracticable and consistent
with the primary purposes of such bureaus, agencies, and services." 16 U.S.C.
§ 668aa(b) (repealed 1973) (emphasis added). Federal agencies tended to interpret
"insofar as is practicable" as a congressional directive merely to consider the protec-
tion of endangered species. See Wood, Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of
1973: A Signocant Restriction for All Federal Activities, [1975] 5 ENvIR. L. REP.
(E.L.J.) 50189.
The policy statement of the ESA is further strengthened by the Act's definition of
the term "conserve:" "to use. . . all methods and procedures which are necessary to
bring any endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the measures
provided pursuant to this act are no longer necessary." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (Supp. III
1979). An "endangered species" is "any species which is in danger of extinction
throughout all or a significant portion of its range." Id. § 1532(b). A "threatened
species" is "any species which is likely to become an endangered species within the
foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its range .... ." Id.
§ 1532(20). Unlike its predecessors, the ESA (and its current amended version) pro-
tects both plant and animal species. For a section-by-section analysis of the ESA, see
Coggins, Conserving Wildlife Resources: An Overview of the Endangered SpeciesAct of
1973, 51 N. DAK. L. REv. 315 (1974-75).
40. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976) (amended 1978, 1980). The text of the 1976 version
was as follows:
All federal departments and agencies shall, in consultation with and with the
assistance of the Secretary, utilize their authorities in furtherance of the purposes
of this chapter by carrying out programs for the conservation of endangered spe-
cies and threatened species. . . and by taking such action necessary to insure
that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by them do not jeopardize the
continued existence of such endangered species and threatened species or result
in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species which is determined
by the Secretary after consultation as appropriate with the affected States, to be
critical.
Id. The ESA of 1973 (as well as the current version) is administered by the Secretar-
ies of the Interior (who conducts consultations with regard to land-dwelling species)
1981]
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menting this mandate. Section 7 required all federal agencies and
departments to consult with the Secretary of the Interior to insure
that their programs did not jeopardize, endanger, or threaten any
species. Three important aspects comprise this section. First, no pro-
vision exists for balancing the interests of the federal agency against
the species: federal actions cannot jeopardize the existence of an en-
dangered or threatened species.4" Second, all federal agencies must
consult with the appropriate Secretary42 concerning the effects of
agency actions or projects upon a species' critical habitat. Third, the
Secretary of the Interior is responsible for designating a species' criti-
cal habitat.43
and Commerce (who conducts consultations with regard to marine species). Further-
more, the Secretary of the Interior must compile, publish, and maintain a list, in the
Code of Federal Regulations, of all species receiving the "endangered" or
"threatened" classifications. For the most recent list, see 50 C.F.R. § 17.1 1(h) (1980).
Section 7 has attracted a great deal of scholarly attention. Discussions concerning
the tensions between § 7 and federal agency actions include: Note, The Affirmative
Duty of Federal Dep'ts andAgencies to Restore Endangered and Threatened Species, 6
HOFSTRA L. Rav. 1067 (1978) (argues that § 7 requires federal agencies to preserve,
protect, and restore endangered species until the species are no longer endangered or
threatened); Note, Obligations of FederalAgencies Under Section 7 of the Endangered
Species Act of 1973, 28 STAN. L. REv. 1247 (1976). See also Wood, supra note 39.
For an excellent discussion of potential problems under the tenth amendment, see
Note, Endangered Species Act." Constitutional Tensions and Regulatory Discord, 4
COLUM. J. OF ENV'rL L. 97 (1977-78).
41. Moreover, under § 7, federal agencies must provide for the conservation of
endangered and threatened species. Conservation is defined in § 4(3) of the ESA of
1973 as "the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any
endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the measures provided
pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (Supp. III
1979). Arguably then, federal agencies must restore a species to a point where re-
moval from the endangered or threatened list might be reasonable. See Note, The
Affirmative Duty ofFederalDep'ts andAgencies to Restore Endangered and Threatened
Species, 6 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1067 (1978).
42. See note 40 supra.
43. The ESA did not define the term "critical habitat;" however, the Secretary of
the Interior interpreted it as follows:
'Critical habitat' means any air, land, or water area (exclusive of those existing
man-made structures or settlements which are not necessary to the survival and
recovery of a listed species) and constituent elements thereof, the loss of which
would appreciably decrease the likelihood of the survival and recovery of a listed
species or a distinct segment of its population. The constituent elements of criti-
cal habitat include, but are not limited to: physical structures and topography,
biota, climate, human activity, and the quality and chemical content of land,
water, and air. Critical habitat may represent any portion of the present habitat
of a listed species and may include additional areas for reasonable population
expansion.
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Part of the mandatory language of Section 7' provides for a con-
sultation process 45 whereby federal agencies must confer with the
Department of the Interior (through the Fish and Wildlife Service),
or with the Department of Commerce (through the National Marine
Fisheries Service). The fact that only three of 4,500 federal projects
which confficted with the ESA resulted in litigation points to the suc-
cess of the consultation process.46 TVA v. Hill,4 7 the most important
50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (1978). The 1978 Amendments to the ESA define critical habitat
as:
(i) the specific areas within the geographical area occupied by the species, at the
time it is listed [by the Secretary], on which are found those physical or biologi-
cal features (I) essential to the conservation of the species and (II) which may
require special management considerations or protection; and
(ii) specific areas outside the geographical area occupied by the species at the time it
is listed [by the Secretary] upon a determination by the Secretary that such areas
are essential for the conservation of the species.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A) (Supp. III 1979). Thus, it appears that if a species' critical
habitat is to include "additional areas for reasonable population expansion," the Sec-
retary must determine that such areas are "essential for the conservation" of that
species.
44. The strength of the language of § 7 becomes clear when contrasted with other
environmental statutes. For example, the environmental impact statement (EIS) re-
quirement under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C) (1976), imposes a duty on federal agencies to include environmental
considerations in their decisions. But NEPA only requires that the EIS be prepared
"to the fullest extent possible." Id. § 4332 (1976). Section 4(f) of the Department of
Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1976), prohibits the use of public parks, rec-
reational areas, or wildlife refuges for highway projects unless "there is no feasible
and prudent alternative" and the project includes "all possible planning to minimize
harm" to these areas. This language is substantially less strict than that found in § 7
of the ESA.
45. See 50 C.F.R. § 402 (1980). Initially, federal agencies must review their pro-
grams for any possible effect on listed species and their critical habitat. Should such
an effect be anticipated, the agency must request consultation with FWS or NMFS
(although FWS and NMFS may themselves request consultation). FWS and NMFS
engage in a threshold examination and issue a biological opinion within 60 days as to
whether a § 7 conflict exists. If the answer is negative, the consultation process is
over. If the answer is affirmative, FWS or NMFS may make recommendations for
modifying the project. Regardless of the consulting agency's opinion as to the pro-
ject's effects, the action agency has the final decision whether to proceed with its pro-
ject. If the action agency chooses to proceed in the face of an adverse determination
by FWS or NMFS, the Departments of the Interior or Commerce may bring suit to
enforce the ESA. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(e)(1) (Supp. III 1979). Alternatively, the ESA
authorizes a citizen suit against the action agency to enforce § 7. Id. at § 1540(g).
46. In the first of these cases, Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir.
1976), affirming 392 F. Supp 130 (E.D. Mo. 1975), plaintiffs argued that construction
by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers of the Meramec Park Lake Dam would jeop-
ardize the endangered Indiana Bat by destroying its habitat. The Secretary of the
1981]
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of these conflict cases, pitted the endangered snail darter against a
partially completed federal water resource project.
Interior had not yet made a definitive determination of the bat's critical habitat. The
Secretary had urged, however, a moratorium on the project. Id. at 1305. Pursuant to
this recommendation, the Corps conducted a survey of the bat population in the pro-
ject area and conceded that the project could adversely affect the species. Neverthe-
less, the Corps decided to proceed with the project. See Wood, supra note 39, at
50194. Although plaintiffs expert witness testified to the contrary, 392 F. Supp. at
144, the district court found no evidence that the project would jeopardize the bat's
existence. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that § 7 of the ESA required only
consultation with the Secretary, not acquiescence in his decision. 534 F.2d at 1303.
For a critique of Froehlke, see Note, The Endangered Species Act of 1973: Is the Stat-
ute ltseff Endangered? 6 ENV'L AFF. 511, 520-23 (1977) (Eighth Circuit employed a
NEPA-like balancing test not authorized by Section 7 of the ESA).
The second of these cases was National Wildlife Fed'n v. Coleman, 400 F. Supp.
705 (S.D. Miss. 1975), rep"d, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom.,
Boteler v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 429 U.S. 979 (1976). In Coleman, a conservation
group sought to enjoin the construction of a section of interstate highway which
would traverse the habitat of the Mississippi Sandhill Crane. The crane was listed as
an endangered species, and its total population (approximately 40 birds) lived within
the proposed highway site. Although the Department of the Interior had officially
requested modifications, federal highway officials approved the project without alter-
ation. Id. at 707. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the Secre-
tary of Transportation had "adequately considered" the danger to the cranes. Id. at
711-12. The Fifth Circuit reversed, declaring that the district court had misconstrued
the mandate of § 7. 529 F.2d at 373. The court of appeals found that the federal
agency had failed to comply with its duty under § 7 to insure that its actions would
not jeopardize the existence of the species or destroy its critical habitat, Id. at 371.
The court then enjoined construction of the project pending further consultation be-
tween the project agency and the Secretary of the Interior. Pursuant to these consul-
tations, the highway was ultimately rerouted to avoid the crane's habitat. For more
detailed discussions of Froehlke and Coleman, see Note, The Endangered Species Act
of 1973: Is the Statute Itsetf Endangered?, 6 ENVT'L AFF. 511 (1977); Comment, Im-
plementing § 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: First Noticesfrom the Courts,
[1976] 6 ENVIR. L. REP. (E.L.I.) 10120.
Although Froehike and Coleman present an apparent conflict in judicial enforce-
ment of § 7, their resolution ultimately turns on the presence or absence of an official
determination of an endangered species' critical habitat. In Froehlke, the Secretary of
the Interior had not determined the critical habitat for the Indiana Bat. Without such
a determination, the Secretary's opposition to the project was taken to be somewhat
speculative. In Coleman, on the other hand, the Fifth Circuit was able to afford more
weight to the Secretary's opposition to the project simply because that opposition was
based on a prior determination of critical habitat. 529 F.2d 359, 366-67.
The Secretary's judgment as to whether a project will violate § 7 may be determina-
tive in suits to enforce the ESA. Nevertheless, the ultimate decision-making power
rests with the project agency to proceed with the project, even in the face of the Secre-
tary's opposition. See National Wildlife Fed'n. v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom., Boteler v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 429 U.S. 979
(1976); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 534 F.2d 1289, 1303 (8th Cir. 1976). The Secretary's
regulations concur. See note 45 supra. The Supreme Court and the Congress have
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B. TVA v. Hill
Initiated in 1967, the TVA's Tellico Project was a multipurpose re-
gional development project designed primarily to stimulate shoreline
development, generate electricity,4" provide flatwater recreation and
flood control, and improve economic conditions.4 9 The crucial aspect
of the project, though not the most costly,50 was a concrete and
earthen dam on the Little Tennessee River. When fully operational,
the dam would impound water covering approximately 16,500 acres,
thereby converting the river's shallow, swift-flowing waters into a
deep reservoir over thirty miles in length. Opposition to the project
centered primarily on the dam and emphasized the potential loss of
the valley's rich farmland, river resources, and several Cherokee In-
dian archaeological sites.5 After unsuccessful attempts to urge the
placed important constraints on such a decision to proceed. See notes 44-46 and ac-
companying text, supra, and note 47 and accompanying text infra. See also notes 111-
65 and accompanying text infra.
47. 437 U.S..153 (1978).
48. The Tellico Dam and Reservoir Project contains no electric generators; how-
ever, an interreservoir canal connecting Tellico reservoir with a nearby generating
plant augments the latter's capactiy. See Brief for Respondent at 5, TVA v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153 (1978). Using TVA's figures, the canal flowage could produce 22 megawatts
of power capacity. As of 1978, the entire TVA system (68 dams throughout the Ten-
nessee Valley-22 within 60 miles of Tellico) was capable of producing 28,223 mega-
watts. See Endangered Species Act Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Resource Protection of the Senate Commitee.on Environment and Public Works, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess., 869, 872-73 (material supplied to witnesses by TVA) [hereinafter
cited as ESA Oversight].
49. See Hearings on Public Works for Power and Energy Research Appropriation
Bill, 1977, Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 5, 261 (1976) (statement of TVA representative). TVA, unlike
other federal agencies, is self-authorizing in its projects; it can undertake such actions
without specific congressional approval, provided that the funds are included in its
yearly lump sum grant. See Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 831(c), (Z) (1976). This represents a crucial factor in the subsequent litigation in-
volving the ESA. The consequence of TVA's special situation is obvious: congres-
sional decision-making with respect to the construction and progress of particular
TVA projects is largely confined to the appropriations process. See Brief for Petitioner
at n.1, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
50. See Brief for Respondents at 5-6, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). The dam
itself was scheduled to be completed in January, 1977. As of March 31, 1976, the
project's total estimated cost was $100 million; $17.4 million was allocated to the main
dam, spillway, and auxiliary dams. Twenty-six million dollars were allocated for
land acquisition, and $35 million for "reservior adjustments, clearing, and rim treat-
ment." See Appendix 499, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1973).
51. See Brief for Respondent at 7, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). In 1971,
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TVA to consider non-impoundment alternatives, local citizens and
national conservation groups brought suit. They claimed that TVA
had failed to comply with the environmental impact statement (EIS)
requirement of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The
district court enjoined the dam's completion pending the filing of an
EIS.52 The injunction remained in effect for some twenty-one
months until the district court concluded in 1973 that TVA's final EIS
for Tellico complied with NEPA 3
In August, 1973 (a few months prior to the district court's dissolu-
tion of the NEPA injunction), Dr. David A. Etnier, a University of
Tennessee scientist, discovered the snail darter in the area around
Coytee Springs, about seven miles from the mouth of the Little Ten-
nessee."4 Dr. Etnier's work in the area led to a proposal for a TVA-
funded research on the snail darter." Soon thereafter, Congress en-
acted the ESA,56 and TVA entered into a contract with the University
of Tennessee to study the snail darter's life history and habitat. The
purpose of the study was to investigate the possibility of transplanting
that species into other rivers.5 1 In October, 1975, the Secretary of the
Interior formally listed the snail darter as an endangered species.
5 8
Tennessee Governor Winfield Dunn officially requested the TVA to modify the pro-
ject for river-based development in order to avoid loss of the farmland. The TVA
rejected Governor Dunn's request. Id. at 7 & n.9.
52. Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. Tenn. N.D.
1972), r9'd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
53. Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973),
afl'd, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974).
54. Coytee Springs is approximately six miles upriver from the site of the Tellico
Dam, thus well within the area which would be flooded by the reservoir.
55. See Brief for Respondents at 10 and n.l1, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
56. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq.
(1976).
57. See Letter from Thomas H. Ripley, Director of TVA's Division of Forestry,
Fisheries, and Wildlife Development to Kenneth Black, Regional Director of FWS,
reproducedin Appendix 540, at 547, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). The objective
of the study was "to conserve and afford opportunities for the perpetuation of the
snail darter." Id. The program would involve six major activities: determination of
life history and ecology, population estimates, habitat description, transplantation to
new habitats, evaluation of transplants, and range and distribution studies. Id. Mr.
Ripley went on to say: "Mo achieve the program objective, TVA considers an at-
tempt to establish the snail darter in other waters through transplantation to be the
most reasonable course of actionfor conservation of the species." Id. at 548 (emphasis
added). Throughout the history of the Hill litigation, the TVA continued to adhere to
this position as a basis for arguing that it complied with § 7 of the ESA.
58. 40 Fed. Reg. 47505-06 (1975). See 50 C.F.R. § 17.11(i) (1978).
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The Secretary determined that the snail darter apparently lived only
in that portion of the Little Tennessee River which the Tellico Dam
and Reservoir Project would flood. 9 Subsequently, the Secretary de-
clared the area affected by the Tellico Dam as the snail darter's criti-
cal habitat.6" The Secretary further declared that, pursuant to
Section 7 of the ESA, all federal agencies must act to insure that their
activities would not destroy or modify this critical habitat.6 1
Meanwhile, TVA and Fish and Wildlife Service had begun a con-
sultation process with a view toward informally settling the issue.
These negotiations proved fruitless because TVA consistently main-
tained that the only reasonable means of conserving the snail darter
was to attempt to transplant it to another river.62 These consultations
59. 40 Fed. Reg. 47506 (1975). The Secretary further declared:
(Tihe snail darter occurs only in the swifter portions of shoals over clean gravel
substrate in cool, low-turbidity water. Food of the snail darter is almost exclu-
sively snails which require a clean gravel substrate for their survival. The pro-
posed impoundment of water behind the proposed Tellico Dam would result in
total destruction of the snail darter's habitat.
Zd.
As of the time of Hill, actual searches by the TVA in more than 50 watercourses
had failed to find additional populations of the snail darter. See Exhibit 46, Appen-
dix 410-412, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). In addition, the Secretary of the Inte-
rior noted that "more than 1,000 collections in recent years and additional earlier
collections from central and east Tennessee have not revealed the presence of the
snail darter outside the Little Tennessee River." 40 Fed. Reg. 47505 (1975). The snail
darter's prior range, however, likely extended throughout the upper Big Tennessee
River and the lower reaches of its main tributaries above Chattanooga (the Hiwassee
[a major site of TVA's efforts to transplant the darter], Little Tennessee, Clinch, Hol-
ston, and French Broad Rivers) all now covered by impoundments. See ESA Over-
sight supra note 48, at 291; Hearings on Public Works for Water and Power
De',elopment and Energy Research Appropriations Bill, 1978, Before a Subcommittee of
the House Committee on Appropriations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 240-41 (1977)
(statement of witness for TVA).
In November, 1980, Dr. Etnier discovered a new population of snail darter in a 10-
15 mile stretch of South Chickamauga Creek straddling the Tennessee-Georgia bor-
der. According to Dr. Etnier, it is "extremely unlikely" that the newly-found darters
are migrants from TVA's Hiwassee River transplant site, located some 80 miles down-
stream. The Chickamauga darters appear to be an undetected natural population
despite TVA's rather exhaustive searches throughout the Tennessee Valley. See U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service, Endangered Species Technical Bulletin (1980). See also
[1980] 11 ENvIR. REP. (BNA) (Current Developments) 1023.
60. 41 Fed. Reg. 13926-28 (1976).
61. Id. at 13928.
62. See note 57 and accompanying text supra. During the summer and early fall
of 1975, TVA transplanted 410 snail darters to the Hiwassee River. See Appendix at
548, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). The Secretary, however, was not satisfied with
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did not include consideration of non-impoundment modifications to
63Ththe project which would permit the survival of the species. The
ESA discourages the use of artificial programs in those instances
when the species' natural habitat may be preserved.64 A reason for
the ESA's firm stance is that it represents a broad commitment to the
preservation of the earth's genetic diversity. One stated purpose is to
provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered
the results of these efforts, finding that TVA had not studied the Hiwassee with suffi-
cient care. 40 Fed. Reg. 47506 (1975). The Secretary noted "[T]hat the snail darter
does not already inhabit the Hiwassee River, despite the fact that the fish has had
access to it in the past, is a strong indication that there may be biological and other
factors in this river that negate a successful transplant." .d.
For a detailed explanation of TVA's transplantation program, see Tennessee Valley
Authority, Program to Conserve the Snail Darter: Progress Report through February
14, 1976, reproduced in Appendix 505-28, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). In refer-
ring to the 1975 transplant into the Hiwassee River, the TVA stated:
[We felt an immediate transplant was desirable prior to a detailed examination
of the candidate sites. This was based on our opinion that a lengthy period of
acclimatization for the transplanted population would enhance the chances of a
natural spawn in the early spring. Additionally, it would allow a full year of
study on the population in the new habitat to be conducted concurrently with
one on the natural population.
Id. at 517. The TVA concluded that the Hiwassee River was a prime candidate for
transplantation based on extant studies of the two rivers. These studies, however,
related to management of trout fisheries in the area. TVA's transplantation effort in
1975 thus appears to be absurdly naive in at least two respects. First, the extant stud-
ies concerned an entirely different species of fish. Second, those studies contained a
great amount of data which had been compiled in 1960-62, and as of 1975, TVA had
not updated much of the information. Thus, TVA's opinion that "a lengthy period of
acclimatization" would "enhance the chances for a natural spawn" could not ration-
ally justify the decision to transplant prior to a detailed study of the candidate sites,
Without a detailed study, little basis would exist for concluding that the transplanted
species' "period of acclimatization" would be at all lengthy. Indeed, scientists do not
yet know whether the Hiwassee transplant will be a long-term success. See 5 U.S.
Fish and Wildlfe Service, Endangered Species Technical Bulletin (1980).
63. ESA Oversight, supra note 48, at 69, 378-79, 890.
64. Note that § 7 of the ESA directs all federal agencies to carry out programs for
the conservation of endangered and threatened species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (Supp. III
1979). Moreover, the ESA defines "conservation" as
...the use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring any
endangered species or threatened species to the point at which the measures pro-
vided pursuant to this chapter are no longer necessary. Such methods and proce-
dures include, but are not limited to, all activities associated with scientific
resources management such as research, census, law enforcement, habitat acqui-
sition and maintenance, propagation, live trapping, and transplantation. . ..
16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added).
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and threatened species depend may be conserved.65
Congress, however, continued to appropriate funds for the Tellico
Project, relying on TVA's assurances of successful transplantation ef-
forts. TVA also asserted that the ESA did not apply to a substantially
completed project that had been under construction before the ESA's
passage. 6 Pursuant to Section 11 (g) of the ESA,67 citizen groups
filed suit against TVA in federal court, seeking to enjoin completion
of the Tellico Project on grounds that it would violate the ESA by
directly causing the extinction of the snail darter.6" The district court
refused to enjoin the project although it found that closure of the
Tellico Dam and the impoundment of the Tellico Reservoir would
result in the adverse modification, if not complete destruction, of the
snail darter's critical habitat.69 The court emphasized that the project
was approximately eighty percent complete and that, given the evi-
dence, no alternatives to impoundment were available short of scrap-
ping the entire project.7" Within a month of the district court's
65. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (Supp. III 1979). A report prepared under the authority
of § 12 of the ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. I1 1979) concluded that preservation of
endangered and threatened species of plants in their native habitats is the best method
of ensuring their survival. Other methods, such as transplantation and artificial prop-
agation, should be used only as a last resort: when extinction appears certain, and
with the goal of re-establishing the species in its natural habitat. See SMITHSONIAN
INSTITUTION, REPORT ON ENDANGERED AND THREATENED PLANT SPECIES OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 51, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). In this context,
plant and animal species differ very little.
66. See Hearings on Public Worksfor Water and Power Development and Energy
Research Appropriation Bill, 1976, Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Appropriations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 7, 466-67 (1975); Hearings on H.. 8122,
Public Works/or Water and Power Development and Energy Research Appropriations
for Fical Year 1976, be/ore a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropria-
tions, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, 3775-77 (1975). The House Committee on Appro-
priations recommended that an additional $29 million be appropriated for Tellico
during 1976. H.R. REP. No. 319, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 76 (1975). Congress approved
TVA's general budget for fiscal year 1976, which contained funds for continued Tel-
lico construction. In December, 1975 (two months after the Secretary of the Interior
had declared the snail darter to be an endangered species, see note 58 and accompa-
nying text supra), the President signed the bill (H.R. 8122) into law. Public Works for
Water and Power Development and Energy Research Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No.
94-180, 89 Stat. 1035 (1976).
67. 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (Supp. 11 1979).
68. Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir.
1977), afd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
69. ld. at 757.
70. Id. at 758. At the time of the district court's decision, TVA had spent about
$78 million on the project. The district court found that if Tellico were permanently
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decision, the Senate and House Appropriations Committees recom-
mended TVA's full budget request for continued work on Tellico.
71
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, Tellico's opponents argued that the
district court had abused its discretion by failing to issue an injunc-
tion in the face of a clear ESA violation.72 The court of appeals re-
versed and remanded with instructions to issue a permanent
injunction halting all activities incident to the Tellico Project that
may destroy or modify the snail darter's critical habitat.7 I The court
ordered that the injunction remain in effect until Congress exempted
Tellico from compliance with the Act, the Secretary of the Interior
deleted the snail darter from the endangered species list, or the Secre-
tary materially redefined the darter's critical habitat.74
enjoined, "some $53 million would be lost in nonrecoverable obligations." Id. at 759.
The court also noted that the ESA was enacted about seven years after commence-
ment of the Tellico Project and that Congress, even though aware of the snail darter
problem, had continued to approve funding for Tellico. The district court concluded
that "[Alt some point in time a federal project becomes so near completion and so
incapable of modification that a court of equity should not apply a statute enacted
long after inception of the project to produce an unreasonable result . I." d. at
760.
71. See S. REP. No. 960, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 96 (1976) and H.R. REP. No. 1223,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 83 (1976). Congress passed TVA's general budget for the fiscal
year ending Sept. 30, 1977. See Public Works for Water and Power Development and
Energy Research Appropriation Act, 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-355, 90 Stat. 889, 899
(1976).
72. Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064, 1069 (6th Cir. 1977), af'd, 437 U.S. 153 (1978),
73. Id. at 1075.
74. Id. The Sixth Circuit accepted the district court's finding that closure of the
Tellico Dam would cause a significant reduction, if not complete eradication, of the
known population of the snail darter. Id. at 1069. Since the record revealed aprima
facie violation of § 7 of the ESA (Ze., TVA had failed to take action necessary to
insure that its actions did not jeopardize the darter or its critical habitat), the court of
appeals rejected TVA's major argument that the word "actions" in § 7 was not in-
tended to encompass the final phases of ongoing projects. The court was unable to
find any positive reinforcement for TVA's position in the ESA's legislative history.
Moreover, TVA's interpretation of the word "actions" was inimical to the ESA's
objectives. Id. at 1071. The court stated:
Current project status cannot be translated into a workable standard of judicial
review. Whether a dam is 50% or 90% completed is irrelevant in calculating the
social and scientific costs attributable to the disappearance of a unique form of
life. Courts are ill-equipped to calculate how many dollars must be invested
before the value of a dam exceeds that of the endangered species. Our responsi-
bility under [Section 1 l(g)(l)(A)] is merely to preserve the status quo where en-
dangered species are threatened, thereby guaranteeing the legislative or executive
branches sufficient opportunity to grapple with the alternatives.
Id. at 1071. It made no difference to the court that Congress had repeatedly appropri-
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Following the decision of the Sixth Circuit, members of TVA's
Board of Directors again testified at congressional hearings in sup-
port of continued appropriations for Tellico. Reporting on various
aspects of the snail darter problem, including the Sixth Circuit's deci-
sion, TVA stated that transplanted snail darters were "doing well"
and the Tellico Dam stood ready to fill the reservoir.75 Both appro-
priations committees recommended the full amount TVA requested
for completion of the Tellico project.7 6
TV4 v. Hill was appealed to the United States Supreme Court."
Chief Justice Burger's majority opinion found the case to present two
major issues: whether completion of the Tellico Dam and Reservoir
would violate the ESA and, if so, what remedy would be appropriate.
The Court ultimately concluded that the ESA prohibited the Tellico
Project impoundment of the Little Tennessee River. It also found
that the Sixth Circuit had not erred in enjoining the completion of the
Tellico Dam.
The Court had little difficulty in rejecting TVA's argument that the
ESA should not apply to a substantially completed project such as
Tellico. The Court argued that the plain language of Section 7 made
no exception for ongoing projects." Moreover, the ESA's legislative
ated funds for Tellico; such legislative approval was merely an "advisory opinion"
concerning the proper application of the ESA. The only relevant legislation was the
ESA itself, whose meaning and spirit were clear. Id. at 1072.
75. See Hearings on Public Works for Water and Power Development and Energy
Research Appropriation Bill, 1978, before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Appropriations, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 4, 234-35, 261-62 (1977).
76. See H.R. REP. No. 379, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 104 (1977). The House Appro-
priations Committee recommended that TVA should cooperate fully with the Secre-
tary of the Interior to relocate the snail darter to another suitable habitat "so as to
permit the project to proceed as rapidly as possible." Id. at 11. The House Commit-
tee then recommended a special two million dollar appropriation to facilitate reloca-
tion. d. The Senate Appropriations Committee concurred. See S. REP. No. 301,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 99 (1977). Congress approved TVA's budget for fiscal year 1978
and the President signed the measure into law. See Public Works for Water and
Power Development and Energy Research Appropriations Act, 197, Pub. L. No 95-
96, 91 Stat. 797 (1977).
77. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
78. Id. at 173. The majority rejected as inapplicable an analogy asserted in Jus-
tice Powell's dissent between the ESA and NEPA (the latter was not to be applied
retroactively). Chief Justice Burger argued that the two statutes served different pur-
poses: NEPA imposes an essentially procedural duty to consider the environmental
effects of federal actions, whereas the ESA is substantive in effect and designed to
prevent the loss of any endangered species, regardless of the cost. NEPA's procedural
directive would be meaningless once a project progressed to the point where the alter-
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history clearly shows that regardless of cost, Congress intended to
halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction.7 9 Indeed, the
majority found legislative history language indicating Congress fore-
saw that Section 7, on occasion, would require the alteration of ongo-
ing projects to fulfill the goals of the ESA.80
native environmental benefits outweighed the cost of abandoning or modifying al-
ready completed work. Section 7 of the ESA, on the other hand, requires not only
consideration of a project's effects, but also the implementation of necessary steps to
insure that species are not "extirpated" because of federal agency actions. .d. at 188
n.34. In addition, the Department of the Interior's regulations that govern the con-
sultation process make no exception for projects in progress at the time of the ESA's
enactment. See 50 C.F.R. § 402.03 (1978) (Section 7 applies to all activities/programs
where remaining federal involvement, in itself, could jeopardize an endangered or a
threatened species). These regulations also require a halt to any significant project
work during the consultation process. Id. § 402.04(a)(3). The Secretary had an-
nounced substantially similar "guidelines" as early as 1975. See 40 Fed. Reg. 17764-
65 (1975).
79. 437 U.S. at 174. The Court reviewed previous federal endangered species leg-
islation, such as the Endangered Species Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926
(1966) (repealed 1973) and the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, Pub, L.
No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (1969) (repealed 1973). These precursors to the ESA directed
federal agencies to protect endangered species habitats only "insofar as is practicable
and consistent with [the agencies'] primary purposes." See Endangered Species Act of
1966, Pub. L. No. 89-669, § l(b), 80 Stat. 926 (repealed 1973). The obvious omission
of this type of qualifying language in the ESA of 1973 revealed a conscious congres-
sional intent to afford endangered species priority over the "primary missions" of
federal agencies. 437 U.S. at 185. Moreover, many initial versions of the 1973 ESA
had contained language similar to the 1966 and 1969 Acts. This language, however,
was ultimately rejected in the final version of the 1973 Act. See 437 U.S. at 176-84 for
a general discussion of the proposed legislation that eventually gave way to the 1973
ESA.
80. 437 U.S. at 186. Justice Powell's dissent, however, charged that the majority's
holding gave retroactive effect to the ESA. See id. at 202-10 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Consequently, the major controversy between the majority and the dissent involved
interpretation of the critical word "actions" in § 7.
The dissent argued that in terms of planning and executing various activities, "ac-
tions" did not include all agency activity, but rather only those actions which the
agency decided to "authorize, fund, or carry out." In essence, "actions" refers only to
prospective actions, those "actions with respect to which the agency has reasonable
decision-making alternatives still available, actions notyet carried out." Id. at 205
(emphasis added). Since the Tellico Dam was "completed" or "virtually completed"
when the lawsuit was instituted, "under a prospective reading of § 7, the action al-
ready had been 'carried out' in terms of any remaining reasonable decision-making
power." Id. Coupling this interpretation with an analogy to NEPA, Justice Powell
concluded that a point always exists at which a federal agency no longer has a reason-
able choice to abandon the project. Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
Justice Powell apparently adopted the position of both the TVA and the district
court that "[t]he nature oftheproject is such that there are no alternatives to impound-
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The Court devoted more attention to TVA's argument that contin-
ued congressional appropriations for Tellico constituted an implied
repeal of Section 7, at least with respect to this particular project.
The majority argued that although Appropriations Committee report
statements tended to support TVA's position, no language existed in
the appropriations acts themselves indicating that Tellico be com-
pleted regardless of the ESA.8" Moreover, an appropriations com-
ment of the reservoir, short of scrapping the entire project." Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp.
753, 758 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (emphasis added). Indeed, the TVA had argued:
The Tellico project is and has always been a dam and reservoir project. Any
'modification' of the project that does not entail a dam and a reservoir is either
an abandonment of the project or an initiation of some other project, or
both....
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 8, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (footnote omitted and
emphasis added). TVA also noted:
[Tihe legislative history abundantly demonstrates that the essence of the project is
theproposedreservoir. The principal benefits for which the project was designed
• ..require a reservoir. The various modifications suggested by respondents
(e.g., agricultural development, tourism geared to historical sites, recreation on
the river in its natural state) would be objectives of some other project.
Reply Brief for Petitioner at 9 n.9, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (emphasis added).
This argument, and that of Justice Powell, deserve additional comment. TVA's
assertion that any modification of the virtually complete Tellico Project would result
either in its abandonment or in adoption of some new project altogether confuses a
project's purpose or goal with the means initially selected to realize that purpose or
goal. It is absurd to argue that the purpose of the Tellico Project was to build a dam
and reservoir. Rather, the purposes of the Tellico Project were to stimulate shoreline
development, to produce electricity, to provide flatwater recreation, and to improve
economic conditions. See notes 48-49 and accompanying text supra. Moreover,
TVA's claim that the Tellico Dam was "the essence" of the Tellico Project is an over-
statement. Simply put, abandonment of the dam and reservoir would not require
abandonment of the project's purpose. Given the multiple purposes of the Tellico
Project, it might be possible to attain those purposes to a certain extent without the
dam and reservoir. This is, of course, precisely what opponents to Tellico had main-
tained.
Thus, to the extent that Justice Powell's argument assumes that the only alterna-
tives available to TVA were scrapping the project or saving the snail darter, it is sim-
ply wrong. Many of the proposed benefits of the project were arguably still available
under a non-impoundment scheme. See notes 96-109 and accompanying text infra.
81. 437 U.S. at 189-93. The majority stated that "[t]he doctrine disfavoring re-
peals by implication 'applies with full vigor when. . . the subsequent legislation is an
appropriations measure.' " Id. at 190, citing Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v.
Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Further, the Court noted that when
voting on appropriations measures, legislators are entitled to assume that the funds
will be used for lawful purposes. 437 U.S. at 190. A contrary policy would violate the
express internal rules of both Houses of Congress, which provide that appropriations
measures may not change extant substantive law. Id. at 190-91.
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mittee expression does not operate to repeal or modify substantive
legislation. 2
The Court invoked the doctrine of separation of powers to deter-
mine the appropriate remedy. Congress clearly intended to accord
endangered species the highest priority. The majority argued that
since Congress properly exercised its legislative power, the judiciary's
duty was to enforce this legislative intent.8 3
II. ALTERNATIVE TO TELLICO: THE GAO AND HANSON STUDIES
Hill contained little discussion of Tellico Project alternatives be-
cause neither the ESA nor its regulations required TVA to seriously
consider alternative plans.84 Following the Sixth Circuit's decision,"5
however, members of the House Committee on Merchant Marine
and Fisheries 6 and its Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Con-
servation and the Environment requested the GAO and the Univer-
sity of Tennessee's Department of Architecture to undertake studies
of the Tellico Project. After presenting preliminary findings,87 the
study groups released final reports8 which raised serious doubts
82. Id. at 191-93. The majority first found that the Appropriations Committees
had no jurisdiction over the subject of endangered species; nor did they conduct the
type of extensive hearings which preceded passage of the ESA. Id. at 191. Next,
absent any relevant language in the appropriations acts, Congress as a whole presum-
ably was unaware of TVA's position. Id. at 192. Thus, considered in the proper con-
text, the statements of the appropriations committees represent only the personal
views of their members. Id. at 193.
83. Id. at 193-94.
84. The TVA has, of course, argued that no alternatives were available to Tellico
short of scrapping it. The district court apparently agreed with TVA's position,
though no evidence concerning alternatives was presented at trial. See Brief for Re-
spondent at 14, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). Chief Justice Burger expressly
declared that consideration of such alternatives, while properly addressed to the Exec-
utive and Congress, was irrelevant to an enforcement action under the ESA of 1973.
Id. at 174, n.19 (1978).
85. 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977).
86. This House Committee and the Senate Committee on Environment and Pub-
lic Works have jurisdiction over the ESA.
87. See ESA4 Oversight, supra note 48, at 178, 195.
88. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFIcE, THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY'S
TELLICO DAM PROJECT-CosTs, ALTERNATIVES, AND BENEFITS (Oct. 14, 1977)
[hereinafter cited as GAO Report]. The University of Tennessee report is summa-
rized in Endangered Species 4uthorization: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Fish-
eries and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Committee on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. at 534-44 (1978) (testimony of
Donald Hanson) [hereinafter cited as Endangered Species Authorization].
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about the Tellico Project.
A. The Hanson Study-University of Tennessee
After investigating various social and economic factors in the Little
Tennessee River Valley, the Hanson study asserted that at least two
viable alternatives to the impoundment-based Tellico Project existed.
The first alternative involved a "dry dam" proposal which, in es-
sence, would allow the Little Tennessee to remain in its natural
state.89 The second involved a combination of the "dry dam" con-
cept and selective impoundment of the Little Tennessee's tribu-
taries.' Based on a comparative economic analysis, the Hanson
Study indicated that TVA's original impoundment scheme might not
be the most economically viable option available.9" The Hanson
Study based this conclusion on the following factors. First, only one
benefit applicable to the impoundment scheme would be sacrificed
under either of the alternatives-the canal-based energy supplement
to an adjacent generating facility.9" On the other hand, the reservoir,
if completed, would preclude many beneficial alternatives, some of
which promised significant economic potential.93 Second, the reser-
voir-based project would not create local employment opportunities,
as TVA had originally thought.94 Agricultural development, how-
ever, would provide many employment opportunities more charac-
teristic of the skills of the local region.95
89. Id. at 535.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 536. This conclusion appears to ignore navigational and flood protec-
tion benefits, both of which would be maximized under TVA's original scheme.
93. Id. The major tradeoff, in the absence of a reservoir, would be the value of
electricity which would be produced by the reservoir facilities (approximately three
million dollars annually, calculated in 1978 dollars) for the annual yield of the high-
grade farmland on the valley floor (approximately $6.4 million, calculated in 1973
dollars). Another benefit lost, if TVA flooded the valley, would be the Cherokee
archaeological and historical sites. The Hanson Report concluded that the develop-
ment of these sites would reap considerable revenues from tourism. Id. at 541.
94. Id. at 543-44. The Hanson Study based this conclusion on the fact that Tel-
lico would supply additional water to currently existing power generating facilities.
Apparently, these latter facilities would not require significant additional manpower
to handle the extra water from Tellico. Even assuming this to be true, however, it
completely ignores substantial employment benefits that could result from planned
industrial development at the proposed reservoir site.
95. Id. at 543.
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B. The GA O Report
The GAO Report answers the following questions:
1) What portion of the dam project already completed would
provide benefits if the project was not completed, and what
costs are involved?
2) Can the Tellico reservoir operate in ways that would not
harm the snail darter?
3) What benefits would result if the dam and reservoir were
completed?96
1. Benefits Without Completion
As of February 1977, 9v TVA had spent about $103 million on the
Tellico Project and estimated that it would need an additional thir-
teen to nineteen million dollars to complete the project.98 TVA also
estimated that approximately $25.65 million of its total expenditures
would provide benefits if the project was not complete.99 The Ten-
nessee Endangered Species Committee (TESC), however, placed the
figure at eighty million dollars."c° For its part, GAO estimated that
about $56.3 million of the project costs (primarily land, roads, and
96. See GAO Report, supra note 88, at 1.
97. The effective date of the Sixth Circuit's injunction.
98. The additional sums would be spent on roads, recreation centers, and reser-
voir clearing. See GAO Report, supra note 88, at 5. Of the total $103 million, TVA
had spent $25.5 million on land acquisition (purchase price, improvements, surveying
and mapping, and other related factors). Id. at 6. In addition, the agency spent $63
million on construction features ($22.5 million for dams, $35.7 million for roads,
bridges, and reservoir clearing) and $14.7 million on engineering, general, and admin-
istrative expenses. Id. at 7-8. Approximately $24.7 million of the construction costs
were applied to direct labor costs. Id. at 7.
99. Id. at 10. TVA's estimate was limited to the current value of the land. The
agency concluded that any increase in property values since acquisition had been
offset by administrative and clearing costs. Id. at 11. Both the Tennessee Endangered
Species Committee, see note 100 infra, and the GAO, concluded that TVA would be
able to recover all of its $25.5 million investment in land acquisition. GAO Report,
supra note 88, at 10. In a subsequent report, TVA indicated that liquidation of the
project (removal of earth dam plus sale of all acquired land) would produce between
$30 and $50 million, depending on whether the land was sold in small parcels ($30
million) or large tracts ($50 million). See ALTERNATIVES, supra note 12, at 37.
100. TESC is an area organization which is knowledgeable about the Little Ten-
nessee River Valley. TESC's estimate assumed that virtually all construction costs
(other than the dam, which would need to be dismantled to ensure the darter's contin-
ued survival) were recoverable. In addition, TESC concluded that $15 million in
salaries and wages would provide benefits. See GAO Report, supra note 88, at 13.
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bridges) could provide some benefit without completing 'the pro-
ject."'O Any benefits, however, would be offset by the necessary cost
of removing all or part of the dam to guarantee the snail darter's
survival.102
2. Project Alternatives
Both TVA and its opponents agreed that even a modified dam and
reservoir at the Tellico site would jeopardize the snail darter's contin-
ued existence.'" 3 Five years after construction began on the Tellico
Project, TVA included an evaluation of six project alternatives in its
EIS to comply with NEPA. Four of these alternatives involved low
and intermediate dam designs, one involved "scenic stream" devel-
opment, and one involved "no further action."'" GAO concluded
that of these six alternatives, only the "scenic stream" proposal re-
mained viable."0 5 Although various interested parties had previously
101. GAO argued that since direct benefits created by wages had already been
realized and that indirect benefits would be realized regardless of whether the project
was completed, salaries and wages should not be included as "benefits" without com-
pletion of the project. Id.
In addition, GAO felt that only about 42% (te., the cost of roads and bridges) of the
total construction costs were recoverable. Because bridges were built higher and
longer than normal to accommodate the reservoir, and because many roads were built
to replace areas to be inundated, benefits derived from these sources would be dispro-
portionate to their costs. See GAO Report, supra note 88, at 12.
102. Life cycle studies of the snail darter indicated that the Telico Dam, even
with its floodgates open, would limit the upstream spawning migration of the darter
and threaten its continued existence as a species. See GAO Report, supra note 88, at
9. In a subsequent draft of a "Snail Darter Recovery Plan," TVA conceded that the
absence of juvenile darters above the dam (prior to impoundment) proved that the
dam created a barrier to upstream migration. See ALTERNATIVES, supra note 12, at
89.
103. GAO Report, supra note 88, at 3,9. See ALTERNATIES, supra note 12, at 89.
See also note 102, supra.
104. GAO Report, -supra note 88, at 16. Prior to 1978, TVA did not update its
arralysis for any of the alternatives. It claimed that the relative economic benefits
from the project and alternatives had not changed and that the reservoir was still the
best method to develop the area. Id. at 17. In 1978 TVA did, however, provide a
major revision in which it considered four options: project as originally conceived;
tributary impoundment (ie., river development on the Little Tennessee, impound-
ment on the Tellico River); river development with dam left in place for flood control;
and river development with dam removed. See ALTERNATIVES, supra note 12, at 13.
In that revision TVA did not view the tributary impoundment alternative as economi-
cally feasible and so did not seriously consider it. Id. at 26.
105. Low and intermediate dams would not be compatible with preserving either
the snail darter or its critical habitat. See GAO Report, supra note 88, at 17.
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proposed alternatives to Tellico, l °6 GAO concluded that neither the
Tellico Project nor any of its alternatives were supported by current
benefit and cost estimates. Thus, resolution of the Tellico question
would ultimately require updated information. 0 7
3. Benefits With Completion
Although project costs increased 115% between 1968 and 1977,
TVA did not update its 1968 cost-benefit projections' 08 until 1978.109
106. Id. at 17-26. The alternatives, which had first been proposed as early as
1964, included: river-based recreational development programs; restoration and de-
velopment of Cherokee and other historical sites; and agricultural development.
TVA's initial consideration of a "scenic stream" alternative apparently excluded these
development programs.
107. Id. at 26. TVA supplied the updated information. The ESC proceeded to
deny an ESA exemption based on that information. See note 12 and accompanying
text supra.
108. In 1968, TVA calculated direct annual benefits of $3.76 million, with a bene-
fit-cost ratio of 1.7 to I. The agency calculated secondary annual benefits of $3.65
million with a total benefit-cost ratio of 3 to 1. See GAO Report, supra note 88, at 27.
Secondary benefits were based on additional job opportunities which would result
from industrial development. TVA did not update its 1968 benefit projections be-
cause it was the agency's policy not to do so once a project was funded and underway.
d.
GAO found that some of these projections were invalid. For example, TVA had
projected annual benefits from "shoreline development" to be $710,000. These bene-
fits would arise from the conversion of agricultural land into higher industrial, resi-
dential, and commercial lands. In projecting these benefits, TVA assumed that 16,500
acres of the total 38,000 acres acquired would be sold to end users and developers
within 12 years of project completion. GAO's analysis also indicated that benefits
derived from approximately 1,000 acres of Tellico land were claimed under two sepa-
rate benefit categories (shoreline and recreation). TVA's estimate of recreation bene-
fits assumed this land would be used as a state park; the shoreline development
benefit calculation assumed the same parcel would be sold for development. Al-
though the TVA had initially deleted the parcel from the shoreline benefit estimate,
the land was apparently reincorporated into the shoreline category when all benefit
categories were consolidated. This duplication caused shoreline development benefits
to be overstated by about $27,000. Id. at 30.
GAO found additional evidence of duplication between navigation and shoreline
development benefits. Navigation benefits were transportation savings which would
accrue to industries purchasing sites at Tellico. GAO argued that because factors that
would make Tellico sites more desirable to industry would already be reflected in
land prices, no need existed for a separate category dealing with navigation benefits.
Id. at 30, 32.
In other instances, GAO contended that the methodology used in the 1968 projec-
tions did not conform to federal guidelines. At the time TVA first estimated the Tel-
lico benefits, these guidelines appeared in THE PRESIDENT'S WATER RESOURCES
COUNCIL, POLICIES, STANDARDS, AND PROCEDURES IN THE FORMULATION, EVALUA-
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Unfortunately, although these projections were more current, they
TION, AND REVIEW OF PLANS FOR USE AND DEVELOPMENT OF WATER AND RELATED
LAND RESOURCES, SEN. Doc. No. 97, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) [hereinafter cited as
WATER RESOURCE COUNCIL]. The guidelines defined "recreation benefits" as the
value of net increases in the quantity and quality of various outdoor activities result-
ing from a project. TVA projected annual recreation benefits of $1.55 million over the
expected 100-year life of the project. However, TVA failed to consider the availability
and attractiveness of other recreation opportunities near the Tellico Project area.
TVA had based its recreation benefit projections on the total number of visits at ex-
isting reserviors in the TVA system (20 within 100 miles of Tellico). It did not con-
sider, though, the possibility that visits at the Tellico reservoir might represent
transfers from other areas. These "transfer visits" would not represent a true benefit,
since a corresponding loss of visitation at other areas would occur. See GAO Report,
supra note 88, at 29.
Senate Document 97 specifically recognized three objectives in water resource plan-
ning: national economic development; preservation of natural resources; and the
well-being of the people. WATER RESOURCE COUNCIL, supra, at 1, 2. Planning was
to be "multi-purpose," considering all significant resource uses and purposes. 1d. at 3.
Significantly, the document stressed consideration of alternatives, stating that all rele-
vant means (non-structural as well as structural) should be considered. Id. The doc-
ument did not, however, define "non-structural" means.
In 1965, Congress passed the Water Resources Planning Act, Pub. L. No. 89-80, 79
Stat. 244 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1962d-3) (1976). This statute estab-
lished the Water Resources Council (WRC), 42 U.S.C. § 1962a (1976) (current mem-
bers of the WRC are the Secretaries of Agriculture, Army, Commerce, Energy, HUD,
the Interior, and Transportation, and the Administrator of the EPA. The Attorney
General, the Director of the OMB, and the Chairman of the CEQ and TVA all sit as
observers). In 1973, the WRC published Principles and Standardsfor Planning Water
and Related Land Resources (P & S), 38 Fed. Reg. 24,778 (1973). The P & S super-
seded Senate Document 97. Id. at 24778, 24863. The P & S state that the overall
purpose of water and land resource planning is "to promote the quality of life, by
reflecting society's preferences" for attaining the following objectives: 1) to enhance
"national economic development" (NED); and 2) to enhance environmental quality
(EQ) "by the management, conservation, preservation, creation, restoration or im-
provement of the quality of certain natural and cultural resources and ecological sys-
tems. . . ." Id. at 24794-95. The P& S declare that the EQ objective is responsive to
man's spiritual, psychological, recreational and material needs, and "reflects man's
abiding concern with the quality of the natural physical-biological system in which all
life is sustained." Id. at 24795. Among the components of the EQ objective are the
following:
a) management, protection, enhancement, or creation of areas of natural
beauty and human enjoyment;
b) management, preservation, or enhancement of especially valuable archaeo-
logical, historical, biological (including fish and wildlife habitat) resources
and ecological systems; and
c) avoidance of irreversible commitments of resources to future uses. Given
our currently imperfect understanding of the potential effects of human ac-
tion on ecosystems, these planning standards emphasize the need for a cau-
tionary approach in meeting development and use objectives in order to
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may have been biased.'11
I. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO TM1 v HzLL
A. The 1978 Amendments
The expiration of the ESA's authorization' in 1978, together with
minimize or preclude the possibility of undesirable and . . .irreversible
changes in the natural environment....
Id.
Moreover, the P & S state that the EQ objective "embraces the concept and appre-
ciation of the values inherent in preservation of ecological systems per se. Id. at
24814. Among the beneficial effects expected to result from such preservation are:
i) the maintenance of a natural environment in a state of equilibrium as an
intrinsic value to society;
ii) development of a 'land ethic' or 'environmental conscience;' and
iii) scientific understanding which will contribute to the conservation of natural
resources in general.
Id.
The P & S also establish a detailed planning process. Id. at 24785, 24866. Two of
the required steps in the process are: 1) formulation of alternative plans, at least one
of which must be responsive to the EQ objective; and 2) analysis of all alternative
plans, so that tradeoffs among the alternatives will be displayed as fully as possible.
Id. at 24786, 24866.
Finally, the WRC declared that the P & S conform fully with the intent and spirit
of NEPA "by providing for full and systematic evaluation and display of environ-
mental effects for all alternative plans." Id. at 24868. For an excellent discussion of
Senate Document 97 and the P & S, see Jaffe, Beneft-Cost Analysis andMulti-Objec-
live Evaluation of Federal Water Projects, 4 HARV. ENVT'L L. REV. 58, 67-72 (1980).
Jaffe argues, inter alia, that the P & S, if enforced via independent review and litiga-
tion, "are likely to be more effective than NEPA as a tool for insuring consideration
of environmental values." Id. at 82-84. Needless to say, it would be fruitful to re-
quest similar consideration of the P & S, either through enforcing the ESA against a
federal water project or an ESC exemption for such a project.
109. In 1978, TVA revised its cost-benefit ratios. See ALTERNATIVES, supra note
12, at 43 (reproduced as Appendix I infra). TVA's revision acknowledged that the
principal criteria then governing the planning of federal water projects "recognize
that value apart from dollar costs and benefits must be meaningfully incorporated
into planning and decision-making." Id. at 4. Although this may be a response to the
P & ,, two facts militate against such an interpretation. First, there is no mention of
an alternative proposal tailored specifically to the EQ objective of the P & S. Second,
it is to date unclear whether the P & S actually have the force and effect of law. See
Jaffe, Benefit-Cost Analysis and Multi-Objective Evaluation ofFederal Water Projects,
4 HARv. ENVT'L L. REV. 58, at nn.122 & 154 and accompanying text (1980).
110. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, AN OVERVIEW OF BENEFIT-COST
ANALYSES FOR WATER RESOURCES PROJECTS: IMPROVEMENTS STILL NEEDED 33
(1978) (citing TVA's disapproval of GAO's recommendation that an independent
agency perform or review all benefit-cost analyses for federal water resource projects).
111. 16 U.S.C. § 1542 (Supp. 111978) (amended 1979).
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the Supreme Court's Hill decision, triggered a rather protracted reap-
praisal of Section 7.112 Congress eventually passed a series of com-
promise amendments which the President signed into law. 13 Among
other changes," 4 the amendments provide case-by-case exemptions
from a Section 7 mandate by a newly created cabinet-level Endan-
gered Species Committee (ESC).
Federal agencies must still consult with the Department of the In-
terior or the Department of Commerce concerning possible impacts
on endangered species. The new consultation procedure is, however,
more structured than that under the ESA. Under Section 7(a), the
agency must insure that its action will not jeopardize any endangered
species." 5 To implement this mandate, the agency must request a
"biological assessment" from either the Secretary of Commerce or
the Secretary of the Interior to determine if any endangered species
112. Sen. Stennis (D.-Miss.) offered an amendment which reinstated the "insofar
as is practicable" language into § 7. Stennis' amendment won approval of almost a
quarter of the Senate. See 124 CONG. REc. S10971 (1978). During the ensuing de-
bate, Sen. Baker (R.-Tenn) stated:
I am absolutely convinced that after the decision of the Supreme Court in the
Tellico case, if we did not build more common sense into the [ESA], if we did not
create some flexibility, if we did not create some way to relieve the tensions cre-
ated by situations like Tellico, if we did not affect the realism that the law re-
quires in the long term, the [ESA] would expire; that there would be so much
opposition to it that the act would be put in jeopardy.
1d. at S 11029 (remarks by Sen. Baker on July 18, 1978). For a discussion of the
various proposed amendments, see Note, Congressional Reaction to TVA v. Hill- The
1978 Amendments to the Endangered Species Act, 13 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 557
(1979).
113. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat.
3751-3767 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1531-1542 (1978)) (amended 1979).
114. This Note is limited to those amendments affecting § 7 of the ESA of 1973.
It should be observed, however, that the amendments make some key definitional
changes in the ESA. First, "alternative course of action" as used in § 3(l) includes all
alternatives to an agency action, and is not limited to the original objectives of the
federal action or project. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(1) (Supp. III 1979). Suffice it to say that
this alone would have prevented TVA and Justice Powell from arguing, as they did in
Hill, that any modification of the Tellico project would require its "abandonment."
See note 80 supra.
Second, the 1978 amendments incorporate a definition of "critical habitat" into the
ESA. A critical habitat is an area within the geographical area occupied by the spe-
cies at the time it is listed that is essential to the species' conservation and requires
special management consideration. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(a) (Supp. III 1979). See note
43 supra. For an explanation of all the amendments, see H.R. REP. No. 1804, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978). See also H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) and
S. REP. No. 874, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
115. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (Supp. 11 1978) (amended 1979).
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exist in the project area.' 16 If none are present, the project may pro-
ceed. If any endangered species are present, Section 7(b) requires the
agency to begin consultation with the appropriate Secretary to deter-
mine if the project will jeopardize the species." 7 Section 7(b) also
requires the Secretary to formulate a written "biological opinion,"
explaining the effect of the project on the endangered species. Sug-
gestions of reasonable and prudent alternatives which would avoid
jeopardizing the species or its critical habitat'" are also required.
Section 7(d) requires that after consultation commences, the agency
may not make any irreversible or irretrievable commitments of re-
sources which preclude the adoption of alternatives consistent with
species preservation." 9 If any jeopardy to the species is found to ex-
ist during consultation, the project may proceed only if the agency
obtains an exemption under Sections 7(g) 120 and 7(h).' 2'
A three-member review board 122 initially considers an exemption
application. The board must first determine that an irresolvable con-
flict exists between agency action and the endangered species or its
critical habitat. 123 Second, the board must determine that the appli-
cant has carried out the consultation in good faith and has considered
modifications or alternatives which avoid jeopardy to the species or
its critical habitat.' 24 Third, the board must find that the applicant
has conducted biological assessments.1 2' Finally, the board must
conclude that the applicant has refrained from making any irretriev-
able or irreversible commitments of resources.' 26 Upon these find-
ings the board submits a report 127 to the ESC.'2 8
116. Id. at § 1536(c).
117. Id. at § 1536(b).
118. Id.
119. Id. at § 1536(d). See H.R. RaP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1978).
120. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g) (Supp. 111978) (amended 1979).
121. Id. at § 1536(h).
122. The review board consists of an administrative law judge, an appointee of
the Secretary of the Interior, and a Presidential appointee from the state in which the
federal project is or will be carried out. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g)(3)(A) (Supp. III 1979).
123. Id. at § 1536(g)(5)(a) (Supp. 11 1978) (amended 1979).
124. Id. at § 1536(g)(B)(i).
125. Id. at § 1536(g)(5)(B)(ii).
126. Id. at § 153 6 (g)(5) (Supp. 11 1978) (amended 1979).
127. The board's report to the ESC must discuss the availability of "reasonable
and prudent alternatives" to the agency action which are consistent with conserving
the endangered species or its critical habitat. Id. at § 1536(g)(7)(A) (Supp. III 1979).
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The ESC is required to grant the exemption if, by a vote of at least
five of its seven members, it determines: (1) no reasonable alterna-
tives are available; (2) the benefits of the agency's action clearly out-
weigh the benefits of the alternative project; and (3) the agency's
action has regional or national significance.' 29 The ESC cannot re-
view an exemption application unless the review board has previ-
ously determined that the applicant has made a good faith
consultation effort. 130 Congress, however, included a special provi-
sion in the amendments allowing for an expedited review of Tellico
by the ESC, omitting prior involvement of the review board.
131
Thus, the ESC found no need to decide whether TVA had engaged in
a good faith consultation effort. Moreover, the ESC based its deci-
sion on only two of the three criteria normally applicable to its deter-
minations. 132 It was unnecessary, in this case, to find that action
involving the Tellico Dam was of national or regional significance.
When the ESC considered the Tellico matter, it contemplated only
two alternatives: completion of the originally planned project or con-
version of the project to establish a river-based development pro-
gram.' 33 The ESC concluded that the latter presented a reasonable
Based on the evidence, the report must also state whether the agency action is in the
public interest and of national or regional significance. Id. at § 1536(g)(7)(B). Fi-
nally, the report must discuss appropriate reasonable "mitigation and enhancement
measures" that the ESC should consider. Id. at § 1536(g)(7)(C).
128. The Secretary of the Interior chairs the ESC. The other members of the ESC
are the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Army, the Chairman of the Council on
Economic Advisors, the Administrators of the EPA and National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration, and a Presidential appointee from the affected State. Id.
at § 1536(e)(3) (Supp. III 1979).
129. Id. at § 1536(h)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1979). Moreover, in granting an exemption,
the ESC must establish and require the agency to adopt "such reasonable mitigation
and enhancement measures including, but not limited to, live propagation, transplan-
tation, and habitat acquisition and improvement as are necessary and appropriate to
minimize the adverse effects" of the project on the species or its critical habitat. Id. at
§ 1536(h)(1)(B).
130. See 124 CONG. REc. S10896 (daily ed. July 17, 1978) (remarks of Sen.
Culver).
131. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(i) (Supp. III 1979).
132. That is, the ESC needed to consider only (i) whether any reasonable and
prudent alternatives in fact existed and (ii) whether the benefits of the Tellico Project
clearly outweighed the benefits of alternative courses of action (such as those urged by
Tellico's opponents in Hill). See id. at § 1536(h)(1)(i)-(ii) (Supp. III 1979).
133. See Comment, The 1978 Amendments to the Endangered Species Act: Evalu-
ating the New Exemption Process Under Section 7, [1979] 9 ENVIR. L. REP. (E.L.I.)
10031, 10033, & n.22 [hereinafter cited as Endangered Species].
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and prudent alternative. The river-based development would utilize
a significant portion of the federal investment in Tellico, while pre-
serving the snail darter's critical habitat.' 34 Moreover, the ESC de-
clared that it was unable to find that the benefits to be derived from
completion of the original project clearly outweighed the benefits to
result from the alternative project.'35 Consequently, the ESC unani-
mously denied the exemption application for the Tellico Project.136
The exemption procedure allows the completion of certain federal
projects despite almost certain harm to an endangered species or its
critical habitat. Upon signing the amendments into law, President
Carter expressed a fundamental doubt about the need for an exemp-
tion procedure, given the apparent success of the previous consulta-
tion process.' 37 To the extent that TVA failed to carry out a good
faith consultation process, Hill may have been a proper basis for con-
gressional concern over the alleged "inflexibility" of the ESA.13 1 On
134. Id. at 10033 & n.23.
135. Id.
.136. Id. The denial ultimately led to the passage of H.R. 4388 (exempting Tellico
from the ESA and all other laws which might prohibit its completion) which Presi-
dent Carter signed into law on September 25, 1979.
137. See note 46 and accompanying text supra. The President believed that this
new exemption process was not necessary, and asked that the ESC cautiously consider
exemptions. See 14 WEEKLY COMP., OF Pars. Doc. 2002 (Nov. 13, 1978). The ESC's
decision on the Tellico Project indicates that it heeded the President's warning. For a
general discussion of the ESC's activities in relation to specific federal projects, see
ENDANGERED SPECIES, supra note 133, at 10033-35.
138. For example, allegations have been made that after discovery of the snail
darter, TVA accelerated its work schedule in order to allow the project to be "virtually
complete" at the time of the beginning of the Hill case in district court. See [1978] 9
ENVIR. R P. (BNA) CuRR. DEv. 1992. See also Brief for Respondents at 13, TVA v.
Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
TVA maintained that the Tellico Project could not be modified without abandoning
it. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Hill, however, TVA Chairman S. David
Freeman (President Carter's first appointee to the TVA Board of Directors) informed
the Secretary of the Interior that alternatives existed to the Tellico Project other than
complete abandonment. One option would be to use the nearly completed dam as a
"dry dam." Mr. Freeman expressed his belief that this alternative would: provide
more flood control protection than the existing project; provide agricultural benefits
exceeding the hydropower benefits of the reservoir-based project; maintain free-flow-
ing river for recreation; preserve the ancestral homes of the Cherokee; and "provide
industrial sites and jobs comparable to the existing project." Letter from S. David
Freeman to Cecil D. Andrus (April 6, 1978), reproducedin Reply Brief for Petitioner,
App. B, 9A-1 IA, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). Mr. Freeman further stated that,
"contrary to the TVA position (articulated prior to his appointment to the Board),
forming a permanent lake is not vital to the Tellico project and may not even be the
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the other hand, the 1978 Amendments require a three-member re-
view board to initially determine if the project agency engaged in
good faith consultation efforts.' 39 Moreover, both the review board
and the ESC must use economic as well as biological criteria to eval-
uate the agency action benefits and alternative courses of action. 140
Thus, only well-planned agency actions stand a chance of exemption.
Unfortunately, exemption may no longer be the sole means to avoid
the ESA duties.
B. The 1979 Amendments
The ESA 1979 amendments 41 alter the critical language of Section
7. The section previously required federal agencies to insure that
their actions did not jeopardize the continued existence of any endan-
gered species.1 42 The statute now requires the agencies to insure that
their actions are not "likely to jeopardize" endangered species. 143
option with the greatest public benefits." Id. at 1 A. He concluded: "[T]he choice is
not the snail darter or the dam. The industrialization and other benefits to the econ-
omy can take place with or without another lake.. . ." Id. at 10A. After the Court
decided Hill, Mr. Freeman reiterated his position and stated that the Court's decision
may have been for the best because the project, as originally planned, may not have
been justified. See Washington Post, June 24, 1978 § A, at 2, col. 3.
139. See 16 U.S.C § 1536(g)(5)(A) (Supp. 11 1978) (amended 1979).
140. Id. at § 1536(h)(1)(9A) (Supp. 111978) (amended 1979). The economic con-
siderations include:
1) cost impact on consumers, business markets, and Federal, State and local
governments;
2) effect on productivity of wage earners, business, and government;
3) effect on competition;
4) effect on supply of goods and services;
5) effect on employment; and
6) effect on energy supply and demand.
See H.R. REP. No. 1804,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1978). The ESC must also consider
the national interest and the aesthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational,
and scientific value of any endangered species or threatened species. Id. In addition,
the ESC may not balance the benefits of the proposed agency action against the value
of the listed species. Rather, it must balance the benefits of the agency action against
the benefits of those "alternative courses of action" which are consistent with preser-
vation of the species. Id.
141. Pub. L. No. 96-159, 93 Stat. 1225-31 (1979) (codified in 16 U.S.C. 1531-1536
(Supp. III 1979)) (amending 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1536 (Supp. 11 1978).
142, 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (Supp. 11 1978) (amended 1979).
143. Pub. L. No. 96-159, § 4, 93 Stat. 1226 (1979) (codified in 16 U.S.C. § 1536
(Supp. III 1979) (amending 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (Supp. 11 1978)). The new language
appears at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
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Legislative history of these amendments, however, indicates that
Congress intended only to clarify the language of Section 7 by con-
forming to then-existing judicial interpretations."'41 Thus, T<4 v.
Hill145 must stand as the controlling interpretation of Section 7.146
Arguably, the new language of Section 7 reflects congressional desire
to avoid repeating Hill's factual situation (discovering jeopardy to an
endangered species after a project is well under construction).147 In-
deed, instead of rejecting Hill's view of Section 7, Congress amended
the section to include a limitation on agency resource commit-
ments148 and a rigorous exemption procedure. 149  Despite such
amending, recent judicial decisions have tested the limits of the ESA
and particularly Section 7.
In Conservation Law Foundation v. Andrus, 5 ' appellants saw fit to
enjoin an Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) lease sale because it consti-
tuted an irreversible or irretrievable resource commitment prohibited
by Section 7(d).' 5 ' Although the consultation process mandated by
Section 7 was in progress at the time of the lease sale, the appellants
144. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 697, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1979). The report
also states that the ESA continues to give the species the benefit of the doubt, and
continues to place the burden of demonstrating compliance on the federal "action
agency." ld.
145. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). The Court does not appear to have limited its interpre-
tation of the ESA to the factual setting in Hill. Id. at 173. The Court argued that
Congress intended to reverse the trend toward species extinction, regardless of the
cost. Id. at 184. Congress apparently accepted that interpretation. See note 146
infra.
146. The conference report also noted that the Supreme Court in Hill had made it
abundantly clear that the prohibitions of § 7 apply regardless of the project's state of
completion. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 697, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1979).
147. See 124 CONG. REc. S 10896 (daily ed. July 17, 1978) (remarks of Sen. Cul-
ver). The 1979 amendment apparently acknowledged the frequent impossibility of a
conclusive determination that jeopardy will not occur., Nevertheless, Congressional
acceptance of Hill, together with the other changes in § 7, should discourage thoughts
that the ESA has somehow been weakened. See notes 148-49 and accompanying text
infra.
148. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (Supp. III 1979).
149. Id. at § 1536(g)-(h) (Supp. 111 1979).
150. 623 F.2d 712 (1st Cir. 1979), aft'g Massachusetts v. Andrus, 481 F. Supp. 685
(D. Mass. 1979).
151. Id. at 714-15. The ESA issue arose because the area of the sale--the Georges
Bank-is a feeding ground in the migratory patterns of two endangered species of
whales, the right (Eubalaena Glaciales) and the humpback (Megaptera novaeanglae).
Massachusetts v. Andrus, 481 F. Supp. at 691.
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argued that should the sale take place, the Secretary of Commerce 52
would only be able to cancel the leases under the standards of the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).153 Because OCSLA
standards differ from those of the ESA, appellants argued that the
species would receive less protection than the ESA would otherwise
provide.' 54 The First Circuit rejected this claim, however, stating
that the Secretary of the Interior would sell the leases, subject to an
implied condition that the enforcement of the ESA would con-
tinue. I5 Accordingly, the court refused to enjoin the lease sale under
Section 7(d). It is arguable, however, that the lease sale (as the first in
a series of steps toward obtaining oil and gas) is precisely the point of
a congressional-favored moratorium at least until Congress can de-
termine the endangered species jeopardy question.156
In North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 5 7 plaintiffs sought to enjoin an
offshore lease sale in the Beaufort Sea on the ground that the sale
would jeopardize the endangered Bowhead whale.' Although the
District Court for the District of Columbia noted that the cost of pre-
152. The Department of Commerce has jurisdiction over whales. See 50 C.F.R.
§ 222.23(a) (1980).
153. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
154. 623 F.2d at 714-15 & n.2. Section 5(a)(2)(A) of the OCSLA provides inter
aha that the Secretary may cancel a lease if he/she determines that activity pursuant
to such lease would probably cause serious harm or damage to life. 43 U.S.C.
§ 1334(a)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. 1II 1979). Under the ESA, of course, the agency and the
lessee are prohibited from making irretrievable or irreversible commitments of re-
sources which foreclose any reasonable or prudent alternative measures consistent
with the § 7(a)(2) mandate. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(a)(2)-1536(d) (Supp. III 1979).
155. The court concluded that this holding simply constituted a basic rule of con-
tract law. The courts generally will not interpret contracts so as to render them ille-
gal. 623 F.2d at 715. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 512 (1932); J. CALAMARI
& J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 22-1 (2d ed. 1977).
156, Note that since Congress amended the ESA after TVA v. Hill, it, in effect,
approved the Court's argument that § 7 should apply regardless of the project's com-
pletion state. See note 146 supra. Moreover, § 7 is precautionary in that it requires
the determination of the jeopardy question at the beginning of the consultation pro-
cess. The § 7(d) limitation on resource commitments constitutes the recognition that
the earlier a jeopardy is discovered, the easier it will be to design alternatives which
comply with the statute. See 124 CONG. REc. S10896 (daily ed. July 17, 1978) (state-
ment of Sen. Culver). See also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 697, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 13,
reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4776, 4781.
157. 486 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C. 1980), aft'dinpart, rev'dinpart, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C.
Cir. 1980).
158. The Bowhead is listed as an endangered species at 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1980).
It has been the subject of federal protection since 1946. 486 F. Supp. 332, 339.
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exploration activities was significant, 59 it refused to hold that the
lease sale violated Section 7(d)'s proscription against irretrievable
commitment of resources. 160 The court ultimately enjoined the sale,
however, because the consultation process had not produced a satis-
factory biological opinion.161 Therefore, consultation must continue
at least until sufficient information is available to support a proper
biological opinion.' 62  Unfortunately, the court of appeals has re-
cently lifted the district court's injunction,' 63 and has authorized fu-
ture lease engagements in all preliminary activities, including
159. The cost of these activities was estimated to be $157 million. Id. at 357.
160. Id. The court reasoned that the money invested in pre-exploration research
was a useful device in deciding whether to proceed with exploration. Moreover, this
cost must be considered a normal consequence of the high risks generally present in
the industry. Id.
The court acknowledged that § 7(d) was designed to prevent an agency from
"steamrolling" a project to secure its completion. Otherwise, an agency would be
tempted to commit resources to the project and then argue for completion, even in the
face of a Hill situation. Id. at 356. By its terms, § 7(d) forbids the commitment of
irretrievable resources that would foreclose any reasonable alternatives which would
not jeopardize an endangered species. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(d) (Supp. Il 1979). In
holding, however, that no § 7(d) violation existed in this case, the district court ap-
pears to have opened the door for a possible Hill situation as massive pre-exploration
investments may very wll lead to a steamrolling effect.
Conservation Law Foundation v. Andrus, as well as North Slope, may have opened
the door to a possible Hill situation. Both permitted lease sales despite the prohibi-
tions of § 7(d). This action has weakened the ESA's consultation process which may
result in a reincarnation of a Hill situation. At the very least, these cases suggest that
the courts will enforce § 7 on an industry-by-industry basis. In "high risk" industries
such an energy exploration, project proponents will be allowed to commit more re-
sources at an earlier stage. Unfortunately, these "high risk" enterprises hold the high-
est risk for endangered species.
161. 486 F. Supp. 354. Section 7(b) of the ESA requires the Secretary to file a
written "biological opinion," at the end of the consultation process, which details the
effects of the agency action on the endangered species or its critical habitat. 16 U.S.C.
§ 1536(b) (Supp. III 1979). In Nor/h Slope, the Secretary had determined that insuffi-
cient information existed concerning the Bowhead Whale to support a proper biologi-
cal opinion. 386 F. Supp. at 352. Agreeing with the Secretary, the district court held
that under § 7(a)(2), the federal "action agency" could not insure that its actions
would not jeopardize the whales or their critical habitat.
162. 486 F. Supp. at 352-54. If the biological opinion indicates that jeopardy is
unlikely, the lease sale may proceed. On the other hand, if the biological opinion
reveals that jeopardy is likely, the sale may proceed only if covered by an exemption
from the ESA. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(h) (Supp. III 1979).
163. See [1980] 11 ENv. REP. (BNA) (Curr. Div.) 422. The court of appeals has
yet to reveal its rationale for lifting the injunction, but has promised a full opinion in
the near future. Id.
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geological surveys.' This result is particularly deplorable because
the range of permissible activities is extended regarding potential
jeopardy to endangered species.'
IV. CONCLUSION
The closing of the Tellico Dam will probably extinguish the Little
Tennessee River's snail darter population. Despite TVA's recent
claim that darters transplanted from the Little Tennessee to the
nearby Hiwassee River are surviving and reproducing, 166 the darter's
future is uncertain at best.' 67 Moreover, both FWS and Dr. Etnier
164. Id.
165. At the very least, the court of appeals in North Slope should clearly establish
that the Secretary has a continuing duty to formulate a § 7(h) biological opinion and
to enforce the mandates of §§ 7(a) and 7(d) if the opinion indicates that jeopardy is
likely to exist.
166. See ALTERNATIVES, supra note 12, at 4-5. In 1975, TVA transplanted 410
darters to the Hiwassee. See note 62 supra. As of August 1978, 411 darters had been
captured, marked, and returned in seven sampling areas of the Hiwassee. Extrapolat-
ing from these results, TVA estimated the total population in the Hiwassee to be
1,936. ALTERNATIVES, supra note 12, at 5, n.2. Using similar techniques, TVA esti-
mated the total population of darters in the Little Tennessee to be 237, and noted that
this indicated "a major and significant decrease" in numbers observed in recent years.
Id. The latter result should have come as no surprise because the dam, even prior to
closure, created a barrier to upstream migration for spawning. Id. at 89. TVA con-
cluded that even absent impoundment of the reservoir, the Little Tennessee popula-
tion would likely die out within one or two years. Id.
167. The Secretary of the Interior established a seven-member Snail Darter Re-
covery Team (two persons from TVA, two from the Tennessee Wildlife Resources
Agency, two from the University of Tennessee, and one from FWS). Id. at 82, n.1. In
light of the probable demise of the darter population in the Little Tennessee, the
Recovery Team removed several hundred darters to the nearby Holston River when
TVA closed the Tellico Dam. See [1980] 11 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) (Curr. Dev.) 1023.
Scientists do not know yet whether the Holston and Hiwassee transplants will be
long-term successes. See 5 U.S. FIsH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, ENDANGERED SPECIES
TECHNICAL BULLETIN, (1980). Among the potential factors which might influence
the Hiwassee population, the Recovery Team noted that agricultural land use would
have a detrimental effect if proper soil conservation techniques were not used to pre-
vent excessive siltation of the river. The Recovery Team also expressed concern that
industrial land use created a significant potential for danger. Since 1971, eight sepa-
rate incidents have occurred in which tank cars, carrying sulfuric acid from a local
copper mine, have derailed near the Hiwassee. Although only one derailment re-
sulted in a fish kill, the Recovery Team noted that a large spill could decimate the
darter population in the Hiwassee. Id. at 85.
Although a new, apparently natural population of snail darters has recently been
discovered, see note 59 supra, the future of the species is still in doubt. Chickamauga
Creek is itself plagued by population from industrial and sewage wastes resulting in
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have stated that it requires five to fifteen years to determine whether
the darter can successfully survive in its new environment.
16
In its most recent analysis of the project, TVA noted that although
benefits exceeded remaining costs for the reservoir and river-based
alternatives, commencement of the project in any form today would
not be economically feasible.169 In addition, TVA stated that many
resources of substantial human and environmental value, which
would be destroyed or severely altered by the reservoir option, could
not be reflected in its benefit-cost analysis.' 7 ' Although TVA admit-
ted that the project's environmental impacts favored a river-based al-
ternative,171 it failed to mention all of the adverse environmental
effects produced by the dam. 72 These adverse effects may eventually
decrease the recreational benefits predicted for the reservoir.
A most significant trend in the development of federal wildlife law
is the requirement that the appropriate agency must consider wildlife
values when planning federal water resource projects. 173 The process
of broadening the wildlife value concept culminated in the ESA
which declares that endangered species of plants and wildlife are of
aesthetic, ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scien-
fish kills. See 5 US.5. Fish and Wildlfe Service, Endangered Species Technical Lulletln
(1980). Because the closure of the Tellico Dam destroyed a previously designated
critical habitat for the snail dater, the FWS will determine whether Chickamauga
Creek is suitable as a new critical habitat. Id. TVA apparently has no plans for fu-
ture projects on Chickamauga Creek. Id.
168. See GAO Report, supra note 88, at 80.
169. See ALTERNATIvEs, supra note 12, at 3, 36. The primary reason for this
conclusion is the approximate doubling of the interest rate since the project was origi-
nally evaluated in 1971. Id. at 111-113.
170. Id. at 3. Indeed, TVA conceded that its benefit-cost analysis would not con-
form to the mandate of the ESA, which expressly recognizes the important "intangi-
ble" values at issue here. Id.
171. Id. at 35, 39-41.
172. The adverse effects which TVA failed to mention are: altered temperature
regime of the surrounding land and water, increased evaporative loss from large sur-
face area of the reservoir;, accumulation of toxic materials due to a general slowing of
water currents; and interference with the flow of detritus (nonliving, primarily organic
material). Needless to say, these factors would have an adverse impact on much of
the wildlife surrounding the dam and reservoir, as well as downstream. See Cairns,
The Modfcation of Inland Waters in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA 151 (H. Brokaw ed.
1978).
173. See Bean, Federal Wildiffe Law in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA 284 (H. Brokaw
ed. 1978).
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tific value to the nation and its people.174 Faced with TVA's less-
than-straightforward attempts to circumvent the ESA, Congress
wisely moved to inject a measure of integrity into the Section 7 con-
sultation process via the 1978 Amendments. Nevertheless, the even-
tual closing of Tellico's floodgates casts an ironic shadow on this
integrity of the legislative process.
174. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
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